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Abstract 
 
 
Changes in fiscal revenues in Bolivia allow us to assess its impact on the fiscal budget and 
spending policy. Based on a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model (DSGE) using 
stylized facts for small open economy, we’re looking for a simulation of fundamentals’ 
responses or effects against different fiscal rules applied. In these sense we use two rules: first, 
where taxes adjust according to the debt level and government expenditures; and second, 
balanced budget where taxes adjust every time in order to maintain the equilibrium in budget. 
Our results show that after the fiscal shock hits the economy, the first fiscal rule has mayor 
stabilization effects on the price level than the second one, around 50%. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the central issues of Policy Makers is to assess the Fiscal Policy effects in the economy. 
Developing economies use this tool as one of the principal mechanism to push up aggregate 
demand and welfare. Additionally, Fiscal Policy can contribute to the economy growth or it 
may harm to the economy through fiscal budget disequilibrium.  
 
Surplus in 2006 was positive for Bolivia, 4.6%. What’s more, fiscal income structure was 
benefit as a result of direct taxation to oil and positive evolution of commodity prices. 
Moreover, in the first half of 2007 Bolivia had a positive result, 4.2%, and for the exercise 
ended on 2007, the superavit was 1.8%. So, this positive environment induces increments in 
fiscal spending to look for social income redistribution.  
 
Nonetheless, one of the Fiscal Policy’s principal should be to assess the fiscal budget, its 
viability and sustainability through time in order to avoid future fiscal disequilibrium so as to 
don’t have negative effects in the economy. 
 
The purpose of the paper is to review and analyze the fiscal expenditures effects of fiscal rules 
simulation on Bolivia’s economy. But, Bolivia doesn’t have any fiscal rule; so, different fiscal 
rules imposition or simulation will help us to assess the performance of the fundamentals in 
the economy through the fiscal policy mechanism. Thus, we reach our objective using a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with the New Keynesian 
macroeconomic vintage for a small open economy (SOE) and applying different types of 
shocks. 
 
Based on Galí et. al. (2007), the paper builds a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model 
(DSGE) with the advances of New Keynesian Theory. It uses consumption heterogeneity (rule 
– of – thumb), market imperfection, and sticky prices and applies different types of fiscal rules. 
First, as in Galí et. al. (2007), taxes are endogenous and move in response to government 
expenditure and debt level. The second uses a balanced budget in every period where taxes 
react every period. 
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In particular, we modified the principal benchmark in order to find more relations that allow 
us explain the Bolivia’s economy since it is a small dollarized open economy (SDOE). In order 
to simplify the external effects we use the Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve. Based on 
Balakrishnan and López Salido (2002) we modified the production function and its factor 
structure so as to put in and assess the pass – through to the economy. 
 
At the same time, Monetary Policy in Bolivia doesn’t have traditional instruments to shock the 
economy, like an interest rate rule (Taylor Rule). So, we use one that can be applied in a small 
open economy and allow us to assess its effects. Based on Schmidt – Hebbel and Tapia (2002) 
and Caputo et. al. (2006), we use a Taylor rule where the interest rate not only reacts to the 
inflation and output deviations, but also to interest rate lags (rigidities) and changes in nominal 
exchange rate. 
 
We use DYNARE in order to solve the model, but first it must be log – linealized. 
Furthermore, parameters calibration is used for Bolivia’s economy in order to simulate its 
behavior and contemporaneous ones common in literature that help us explain the behavior in 
other developing economies. 
 
The two fiscal rules application is compared with a model that doesn’t consider a fiscal rule, so 
the canonical model allow us to assess the true multiplier effect of fiscal shocks on 
fundamental macroeconomic variables for Bolivia.  
 
A Fiscal shock produces an increase in total consumption explained by a positive increase in 
the rule – of – thumb households. However, a fiscal shock generates pressures on inflation, 
increase, through the forms cost channel; after that, interest rate increases against fiscal 
pressures on inflation restrained pressures on inflation. 
 
Furthermore, the model structure allows us to assess the effects of the fiscal shock on the 
other variables. It produces nominal exchange rate depreciation and real exchange rate 
appreciation. On the other hand, risk premium and tax pressure increases. 
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The paper is organized as follows: section 2, reviews literature about fiscal expenditure effects 
and other economies experience; section 3, develop the model methodology; section 4, 
describes data and calibration; section 5, shows fiscal shock effects under the two fiscal rules, 
and finally section 6, concludes and give new future investigation guidelines 
 
2. Literature review 
 
There is no explicit evidence in Bolivia that tried to study the fiscal rules effects on the 
economy in the new macroeconomic vintage, called Newkeynesian. Then, empirical papers 
and investigation in this way are restricted to other economies. 
 
2.1 Foreign evidence  
 
The negative response of the consumption against an increase in government spending is 
insufficient; this result can be obtained in Ricardian RBC models or as in the neoclassic model 
predictions, Christiano and Eichenbaum (2002), and Fatás and Mihov (2001, FM). 
 
Therefore most of the evidence is concentrated in VAR models. Blanchard and Perotti (2002, 
BP) and FM (2001) found that, against to neoclassical models, in response to a fiscal 
expenditure shock consumption increases, but in different degree. Besides, investment doesn’t 
have a unique response: in the first case, investment falls in great magnitude; and, in the 
second one, investment increases insignificantly. 
 
Using United States quarterly data Galí et al (2007) shows when an increase in government 
spending is significantly, so it produces a persistent increase in output and at the same time a 
persistent increase in consumption3. Then, working hours and real wage increases; and in the 
short run investment falls but in the medium it improves, but not significantly. What is more, 
deficit increases, too. 
 
                                                 
3  This output is explained because of the introductions of rule – of – thumb consumers in the canonical structure 
of the model 
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Mountford y Uhlig (2004), Burnside et al (2003) find that in response to a fiscal shock, 
consumption responses weakly and not significantly. 
 
In addition, Alesina and Ardagna (1998) show that during periods of fiscal consolidation 
forecast of the neoclassical model were good; so, fiscal spending reduction yields positive 
movements in consumption and output. 
 
In summary, the evidence in favor of negative comovement between output and consumption 
in response to a fiscal positive shock is not consistent with the neoclassical model. 
 
3. Model Methodology 
 
The model is based on Gali et. al. (2007), we model a small open economy (SOE) in order to 
introduce the Bolivia’s economy characteristics. 
 
3.1 Households 
 
Newkeynesian models with rule – of – thumb households, includes myopic or lack of credit, it 
helps us to explain positive movements in total consumption against business cycle models 
with full ricardian consumers or neoclassical models. Rule – of – thumb households only 
consume the product of their work, they have fear to save (asset accumulation) and ignore 
intertemporal consumption. On the other hand, ricardian households or optimizers have assets 
and access to the capital market and receive benefits of the firms.  
 
The coexistence of these two types of agent allows us to explain the positive movement of 
total consumption in response to a fiscal shock. 
 
3.1.1 Ricardian households 
 
They have a utility function subject to a budget constrain and response to their own 
characteristics. Following Galí et. al. (2007) we can introduce investment at last. 
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Capital law of motion with adjustment cost is: 
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Where Nt
c
t υυ ,  are idiosyncratic shocks of preference that hits consumption and labor. The 
taxation effect on Ricardian households can be seen in the Euler equation that is shocked by 
preference shocks. 
 
Optimality conditions are: 
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The Euler equation is: 
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Capital shadow price, Tobin’s Q, is given by:  
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Moreover, we have two options related to the labor market structure: first, a competitive labor 
market where each household choose labor supply given the market wage and; second, wages 
can be fixed by unions4. Then, in the last case, wages can be determined by households. 
 
Therefore, labor supply is influenced not only by taxes on consumption and work, but also is 
affected by preference shocks. 
                                                 
4 Bénassy (2002) ch 5. 
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3.1.2 Rule – of – Thumb households 
 
This type of households only receives income labor for their work. So, not only they consume 
all of their labor income, but also not save. Additionally, they don’t have access to the capital 
markets.  
 
They have a utility function: 
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  ( ) ( ) NWPCP rttNttrtctt ττ −+ = 11   (10) 
 
3.2 Demand goods 
 
In order to find the good market equilibrium we need to differentiate domestic and foreign 
consume. Following Gali and Monacelli (2005), consumption takes a CES form. 
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Where tFtH CC ,, ,  are consumption of domestic and foreign goods
5 and take a CES form and 
the Dixit – Stiglitz aggregators of imported and domestic goods are: 
 
                                                 
5 We didn’t take into account imported goods because we use the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, and put 
imported goods in the production function and it takes the CES form. So, effects of imported prices affect 
directly to the NKPC. 
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and in supposed that the aggregate price level is given by: 
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So, when tHtF PP ,, = , α is the proportion for domestic goods given the imported goods. α is 
the natural open index, also. 
  
3.3 Aggregation 
 
Aggregation is as follows: Total consumption is the sum of Ricardian households and rule – of 
– thumb. The total number of hours worked is the same as total consumption and λ is the 
share of rule – of – thumb. 
 
  ( )CCC otrtt λλ −+= 1   (15) 
  ( )NNN otrtt λλ −+= 1   (16) 
 
Since only Ricardian consumers have access to the capital market, investment and capital stock 
market are given by: 
 
  ( )II ott λ−= 1    (17) 
  ( )KK ott λ−= 1    (18) 
 
Domestic and foreign assets, including fiscal debt BGt *  are given by: 
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  ( )BB ott λ−= 1    (19) 
  ( )BBB otGtt λ−+= 1 ***   (20) 
 
3.4 Firms 
 
There exists a continuum set of competitive monopolistic firms. All of them produce only 
intermediate goods; but production factors are competitive. In particular, final goods are 
produced by constant return technology (CES production function). 
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( )jYt  is the quantity of intermediate goods used as input. So, intermediate goods demand is 
given by Dixit – Stiglitz aggregator: 
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And prices are given by: 
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3.4.1 Intermediate Goods 
 
We assume a continuum set of monopolistic firms. In order to put the pass- through in the 
price equation, HNKPC, we use imported price goods as input. Our production function takes 
a CES form with M and N as inputs. 
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At is the technology and technology shock act through this, and sσ is the elasticity of 
substitution between imported goods and work. Both of them are greater than zero. 
Intermediate imported goods are ( )tjM 6. 
 
Given that the real price of factors MtP  and tW , the equilibrium through a minimization cost 
is: 
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Marginal cost is given by: 
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3.1.5 Price setting 
 
Following Calvo (1983), (1-θ) is the fraction of firms that reset its price optimally each period 
believing that the price chosen will be optimally t periods ahead. While a fraction θ keep their 
prices unchanged. Based on Galí and Gertler (1999), we can put in the optimal price a fraction 
of firms that reset their prices forward – looking, (1-ω).  At the same time, a fraction 1ω set 
prices backward – looking. This set of firms reset their prices based on the optimal price and 
inflation in t-1. 
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6 Intermediate firms’ aggregation also takes a CES form. 
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In steady state we can get kktt β=Λ +, . Moreover, to complete the dynamic price we must use 
the following equation. 
  ( )PPP ttt θθ −+= − 1 *1   (32) 
  ( ) PPP btftt ωω *** 1 += −   (33) 
  pi 1
*
1
*
−−
+= tt
b
t PP    (34) 
 
3.5 Monetary Policy 
 
Since Bolivia doesn’t have common policy instruments, monetary interest rate rule, we can 
model monetary policy by Taylor Rule and taking care of that  considers exchange rate items. 
This type of rule was used by Schmith – Hebbel and Tapia (2002) and Caputo et. al. (2006) 
 
 ( )( ) υψψpiψψψ pi mttstytitit syrr +++−+ ∆= ∆− 11   (35) 
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Where rt is the real interest rate, that is a monetary policy tool, piψ and yψ  are responses of the 
monetary authority to deviations of inflation and GPD growth of their natural level. s∆ψ shows 
response to nominal exchange rate deviations. 
 
3.6 Fiscal Policy 
 
Government budget constraint and taxes revenues are given by: 
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3.6.1 Fiscal Rules 
 
Galí et. al. (2007) proposed a fiscal rule where taxes revenues are equal to government 
expenses. Let’s define Y
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t
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t
tt −= and bonds as Yt
P
B
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−

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
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1 . So, according to this rule, 
taxes adjust whenever debt or spending change.   
 
Fiscal rules applied are generalization of García and Restrepo (2007). 
 
 ( )( ) GPBYPSPIPYPCP ttgtbFtFttFttttttttct φφττ +=−+−+ *  (38) 
 
Allowing 1=gφ  and 0=bφ , the government budget constraint is in equilibrium, and in order 
to hold it taxes must adjust in every period. 
 
 ( )( ) GPYPSPIPYPCP ttgFtFttFttttttttct φττ =−+−+ *  (39) 
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3.7 Market clearing condition 
 
Market clearing conditions are given by: 
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3.8 Closing the model 
 
In order to close the model we must use the following equations: 
 
Real exchange rate 
 
  
P
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t
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Interest rate 
  
  pi 1int ++= ttt r    (45) 
 
Uncovered interest parity 
  ssrr ttttt −+=− ++ 1
*
1pi   (46) 
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3.9 Stochastic exogenous process 
 
Many shocks hit the economy: 
 
Preference shocks 
  ευρυ ctctcct += −1    (47) 
 
  ευρυ NtNtNNt += −1   (48) 
 
Technology shocks 
 
  ερ attat aa += −1    (49) 
 
Monetary shocks 
  ευρυ mtmtmmt += −1   (50) 
 
Fiscal spending shocks 
  ερ gtt
g
t gg += −1   (51) 
 
Foreign interest rate shocks 
  ερ ** 1** rttrt rr += −    (52) 
Foreign prices shocks 
 
  ερ
** *
1
* FF p
t
F
t
pF
t pp += −   (53) 
 
Where iρ  represent shocks persistence itε  and follows a normal distribution with zero mean 
and variance 2
,tiσ , 
**
,,,,,,
FmNc prgai υυυ= ; what’s more, innovations are not correlated. 
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4. Data and calibration 
 
We use the following series: consumption, GDP, investment, fiscal spending, net exports, tax 
rate, real remuneration, total population working, Bolivian real interest rate, nominal and real 
exchange rate, inflation, domestic and external debt; and foreign interest rate. 
 
Log – linearization technique requires all variables must be log – deviations from steady state7, 
so it’s necessary use some steady state measure8.  But, there is not theory that supports the 
steady state, e.g. GDP, should be a moving average weighted, which is HP’s outcome. In this 
sense, all variables are hit by shocks and it produces changes in business trend – cycles, 
therefore, high frequency band pass filter proposed by Christiano & Fitzgerald (1999), which is 
unvaried method,  allow us to incorporate business cycles and isolate short or long run 
movements privileging business cycles defined by the researcher. 
 
Alternatively, we can use the Nadaraya – Watson non – parametric filter. So, if we understand 
seasonality as systematic movement, no necessary regular, produced in the year, Hylleberg 
(1992); the problem is, how to treat it? First, there is a group of economists that believe that 
seasonality must be eliminated; second, another group point out that seasonality is known by 
economic agents and they will make their decisions according to these; consequently, it should 
be an error to eliminate seasonality in an economic research. 
In this sense, to isolate seasonality components, we have a lot of methods and procedures and 
it performs depend on what we are looking for: a) an effortless filter which use regression with 
dummy variables; b)Box – Jenkins (1976) difference seasonality filter; c) ARIMA X-11 and X-
12 filter; d) TRAMO/SEAT filter. 
Based on Bianchi (1997), we applied ARIMA X-12 which discomposes series under an additive 
background. Trend – cycle component can be obtained using ARIMA X-12, so we can apply a 
kind of filter like HP to get the cycle and long run trend. 
 
Steady states of variables and calibrated parameters are listed in tables 1 and 2. 
                                                 
7 In  dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models we must understand that it refers to the natural level where 
there is no market frictions  
8 Hodrick y Prescott filter is generally accepted 
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The following steady states are obtained using Nadaraya – Watson filter: C/Y, I/Y, G/Y, 
X/Y, M/Y, G/C, Pf/P, Yf/Y, RER, N, W, inflation and tax pressure. Country risk premium is 
calibrated using Corp Banca Group average qualification to Bolivia. At the same time, 
consumption, labor and capital taxes are taking from Bolivian tax structure.   
 
Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve parameters are obtained from Valdivia (2008) taking 
care of contemporaneous pass – through similar to other papers for Bolivia, before 2005. 
Moreover, Taylor rule, which takes the responses of the Central Bank to variations of nominal 
exchange rate, is estimated by General Method of Moments (GMM). Results of the GMM 
procedure gave us consistency when the Central Bank is worried about exchange rate 
movements, in our case crawling – peg system.  
 
Nominal interest rate calibration is based on the Central Bank of Bolivia Monetary Report 
(January, 2008). Besides, Bolivia population structure of Ricardian households and rule – of – 
thumb households are taking of National Statistical Institute household’s surveys. The last 
parameters are standard in economic literature   
 
5. Fiscal spending effects 
 
Fiscal rules reduce exogenous shocks effect on the economy. Figure Nº 1, shows how fiscal 
shock hits the economy and how the model reacts according to the first fiscal rule. In this case, 
domestic debt, foreign debt, total consumption, rule – of –thumb households, ricardian 
households, investment, capital, nominal interest rate , labor, Tobin’s Q, inflation, country risk 
premium, real interest rate, real exchange rate, marginal cost, tax pressure, nominal exchange 
rate, wages, net exports, capital price and output (GDP). 
 
If we consider positive shocks in all exogenous variables, we can expect that variables are hit 
by the fiscal shock and other shocks; they generate movements that produce oscillations in 
impulse responses functions. For that reason, once the fiscal expenditure shock hit the 
economy, the model structure, with lags, allows oscillations in variables due to they are hit by 
other shocks. 
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We can observe that fiscal spending shock has positive effect over total consumption, as a 
consequence of agent’s structure, figure Nº 1. As we expected, rule – of – thumb households 
reacts in a positive manner explained, 2.5%, by an increase in the real interest which reduces 
Ricardian household’s consumption, -0.6%. What’s more, as output increases, 0.6%, price of 
factors raises as well, 3% and 1.2%, it is reflected in an inflation increase, 2%, through the 
firms channel cost. In response to inflation increases, the Central Bank raises its nominal 
interest rate, 35bp, in order to moderate investment, -2%, and reduce inflation pressures. As a 
consequence, this negative effect acts on Ricardian households that reduce their consumption.  
 
The multiplier effect of fiscal spending shock is reflected in new levels of foreign debt, it 
increases 2%, which has effects on variables taking in the model. As a consequence of 
increases in price of factors, labor supply increases, 1.35%, explained by hand – to – mouth 
households. On the other hand, there is a depreciation of nominal exchange rate, 1.8%, as an 
effect of inflation increases greater than interest rate increase. At the same time, since price 
increases are greater than nominal exchange rate depreciation, it turns out a weaker real 
exchange rate appreciation, 0.05%; so net exports are affected negatively, 0.05%, but over the 
time it recovers to its natural level and is led by exchange rate movement. 
 
Shadow price of capital, Tobin’s Q, falls as a consequence of negative effect of fiscal spending 
shock, 0.025%. This result is consequence of increases in prices that are greater than increases 
in real interest rate and capital price. Moreover, country risk premium is boosted by nominal 
exchange rate depreciation, 1.5%, and foreign debt increase is greater than output and inflation 
increases. Finally, since output increases, pressure tax is pushing up by output movements, 2%. 
 
Figure Nº 2 shows how the model reacts to the second fiscal rule, when only taxes act, and 
how it helps to reduce the effect the fiscal spending shocks. In this case, since the economy is 
hit by fiscal shock, it reduces the tax pressure, 1.9%, in order to generate more fiscal spending, 
and external debt increases, 3.5%. 
 
Impulse response structure is the same as the first fiscal rule, but magnitudes are different. The 
most relevant results are: a) the increase of total consumption is greater than the first one; b) 
since the increase in factor prices is greater than the first one, marginal cost is higher and pass 
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– through to inflation increases  are more than in the first case; c) since inflation increases, the 
Central Bank responses aggressively through increases nominal interest rate, so investment 
contraction is higher than depreciation in nominal exchange rate in order to moderate inflation 
imported. 
 
Finally, in the case of Bolivia we need to know, what of the two fiscal rules have more 
stabilizing effects against to a fiscal spending shock? In figure Nº 3, we compare results 
obtained above with a canonical model that doesn’t have a fiscal rule. 
 
In all outcomes obtained above, the first fiscal rule, when taxes act against to new external debt 
in order to generate more fiscal spending, has more stabilizing effects. In particular, the effect 
of fiscal spending shock on inflation is moderated around 50% of the total effect. The effect of 
fiscal shock without rule is 0.45% on the inflation, and applying the rule reduces it to 0.21%. 
This outcome can be seen comparing the canonical model when it doesn’t have a fiscal rule 
with the one that has it.  
 
Despite of the fiscal shock effect on output is sacrificed, and all variables which are influenced 
by it. In terms of welfare, the outcome obtained above is preferable cause of negative inflation 
effects is reduced on consumption. 
 
6. Conclusions and future research 
 
We developed a canonical model according to new macroeconomic vintage called new 
Keynesian models with imperfect competition in the determinacy of inflation. 
 
Based on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, we looked for to compare the 
fundamentals performance when they are hit by fiscal spending shock. We used two types of 
fiscal rules: first, taxes adjust according to debt level and government spending, therefore debt 
plays a central role; second, a budget balanced – zero debt – where taxes adjust every time in 
order to keep equilibrium. 
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Consequently, after computing and simulating our three models, two of them with different 
fiscal rules and one with any fiscal rule, our results can be summarized as follows: a) an 
increase in total cost of factors, e.g. prices, and an increase in consumption of rule – of – 
thumb households; b) since marginal cost increased, through HNKPC, inflation raises more 
than expected, and Central Bank must react through raising the monetary policy interest rate 
leading investment to diminish in the short run, so as to reduce inflation pressures; c) there is a 
nominal exchange rate depreciation and little real exchange rate appreciation; d) exports are 
guided by real exchange rate, and finally; e) country risk premium raises. 
 
Finally, the most important result is how the first fiscal rule has more stabilizing effects over 
the fundamentals and overall in the model than the second one, when we consider a budget 
balanced getting zero debt level. What’s more, inflation reduces around 50% as a consequence 
of fiscal shock 
  
Future research in this type of models applying fiscal rules should consider: a) not only an 
open economy Phillips Curve which takes into account inflation imported, but also acquire 
total prices aggregation and modeling two Phillips curves in order to clarify the inflation 
imported channel; b) a structural fiscal surplus effects and its effects against exogenous shocks, 
c) not only a calibrated model, but also compute using Bayesian econometric techniques so as 
to improve estimations and forecasting about fundamentals. 
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Table Nº 1 
Steady States 
C/Y 0.74 
I/Y 0.15 
G/Y 0.12 
X/Y 0.27 
Pf/P 0.0052 
Yf/Y 1.32 
RER 98.73 
M/Y 0.29 
tau/C 0.40 
b/C 0.65 
G/C 0.15 
tau/Y 0.14 
Country risk 5 
 
Table Nº 2 
Basic Parameters 
σ Risk aversion coefficient    2 
τc consumption tax rate    20% 
τn Labor tax rate     13% 
τk  Capital tax rate     40% 
λ Weight of rule – of – thumb households   0.7 
ϕ Marginal elasticity of labor disutility   1.7 
υc Consumption idiosyncratic shock in ss  1 
υn Labor idiosyncratic shock in ss   1 
δ Depreciation rate     0.25 
η Investment elasticity to Q    1 
 Π Inflation in ss      6.01 
ηx RER elasticity exports    1 
α Capital share in CES production function  0.6 
ξf HNKPC forward parameter    0.4966 
ξb HNKPC backward parameter  0.4581 
λpi HNKPC marginal cost parameter   0.4852 
χmc HNKPC foreign pass-through    0.4278 
σs CES Substitution elasticity     2 
ψi Taylor rule inertial interest rate component   0.96 
ψpi  Taylor rule inflation component   1.25 
ψy Taylor rule output component    6.9070 
ψs Taylor rule nominal Exchange rate variation comp  -14.95 
R* Foreign interest rate    4.43% 
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Figure Nº 1 
Fiscal Shock Impulse Responses  
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Figure Nº 2 
Fiscal Shock Impulse Responses 
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Figure Nº 3 
Fiscal shock evaluation of impulse responses 
Rules 1, 2 and canonical model that doesn’t have any rules 
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R1 rule 1, R2 rule 2 and “C” represent the canonical model without rule 
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Appendix A 
Log – linearized Model 
Log- linearized model solution around the steady state is: 
 
Ricardian and rule-of-thumb households: 
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Aggregation of consumption: 
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Interest rate and investment return are given by: 
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Capital law of movement: 
  
 ( ) ikk ttt δδ += −+ 11   
 
Equilibrium: 
 
 xgicy ttttt Y
X
Y
G
Y
I
Y
C
+++=  
 
Labor, investment, capital and debt aggregation are given by: 
 ( )nnn otrtt λλ −+= 1  
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The economy constraint: 
 
φˆ***
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Country risk premia: 
 ybps ttttt −+−=
*
ˆφ  
Foreign production function 
 ερ yftFt
yfF
t
yy +=
−1
 
Exports: 
 crerx tt
x
t
*
+=η  
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Real Exchange rate: 
 ppsrer t
F
ttt
−+=
*
 
Labor and consumption shocks: 
 ευρυ ctctcct += −1     
 ευρυ NtNtNNt += −1    
 
Technological shock 
 ερ attat aa += −1     
Monetary shock 
 ευρυ mtmtmmt += −1    
Fiscal shock 
 ερ gtt
g
t gg += −1     
Foreign interest rate shock 
 ερ ** 1** rttrt rr += −     
Foreign prices shock 
 ερ
** *
1
* FF p
t
F
t
pF
t pp += −  
Taxes shock 
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Firm’s decisions 
 wpmn t
m
ttt
−=−  
Production function is given by 
 ( )nmay tttt αα −++= 1  
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The Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
 


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
 +++++=
−+ wspmc tt
F
ttt
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11 ρλpiξpiξpi pi  
Marginal Costs are given by 
 ( )( ) ( ) apwmc tmtsmctsmct −−+−−= 111 σχσχ  
Monetary policy rule 
 ( )( ) υψψpiψψψ pi mttstytitit syrr +++−+ ∆= ∆− 11  
Fisher’s equation 
 pi 1int ++= ttt r     
Uncovered interest parity 
 ssrr ttttt −+=− ++ 1
*
1pi  
Fiscal Rule 1 
 ( ) gbc tgtbttctc CGCbC φφτττ τ +=+ ˆˆ  
 
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Fiscal Rule 2 
 ( ) gc tgttctc CGC φτττ τ =+ ˆˆ  
